Introduction

With July 18th and the Election of the 15th President of India fastly approaching, it seems worth analysing the role of the President within the democratic system of India, and what are the implications of this on the overall democratic system of India. A similar analysis has to start from the reasoning behind the adoption of a democratic system oriented as a parliamentary republic, with the two separate figures of President and Prime Minister.

Three main themes can be discussed prima facie:

1) what is the role of the President in parliamentary systems.

2) the definition of nomination v. election when related to indirect democratic instruments, and, probably most importantly

3) what is the importance of this specific Presidential Election as part of the current political discourse in India.

Looking at the role of Presidents, it has been noticed that “the office of the presidency makes its appearance in almost all non-monarchical constitutions”¹. The role of the President in parliamentary versus presidential systems, however, is extensively different. Specifically, in parliamentary systems, such as the case of India, “the parliamentary executive is complemented by the figure of the head of state”². This implies that, to a certain extent, the role of the President is grounded in a democratic function other than executive. Such reasoning in parliamentary systems requires ad hoc analysis to shed light on this democratic office.

Understanding the role of the President in parliamentary democracies also means observing the specific processes entailed for the election towards this democratic office. While a full analysis of the mechanisms behind this transfer of powers would probably require an independent analysis that goes beyond the objective of the reflections collected in this article, it is fair to say that even within parliamentary democracies, where the President is generally not directly elected by constituents, this is certainly an election. It is possible to state so based on the basic definition of elections as “mechanisms capable of translating the popular will into institutionally-defined roles”³. And indeed, when it comes to the election of the President within parliamentary democracies, that element of popular will, characterising electoral mechanisms, is fully present. The only propriety which has to be considered in the specific case at end is the realisation of such “translation” via the intervention of all or some elected members of the Parliament, instead of that occurring directly via polling procedures.

Zooming into the specificities of the presidential election in India, this analysis would not be complete without looking at the role and powers of the President as part of the Indian democratic system. These are non to be overlooked, let alone ignored, as scholarship underlined how “the Constitution of India contains a vast reservoir of powers for the president”⁴ , also specifying how this reaches the roots of the nature itself of Indian democracy, as, referring to presidential powers, it has been historically stated that “in what manner these shall be exercised is the moot question on the answer to which shall largely depend the exact nature of the executive of India, whether it will be purely parliamentary, [...] or he will effectively exercise some of his powers independently of the Council of Ministers”⁵.

Adopting a comparative approach and referring to other examples of presidential office within parliamentary democracies to better identify the role of such in India, this analysis aims at highlighting why this Presidential Election should not go unnoticed and, ultimately, why this matters at this point in time.

The Role of Presidents in Parliamentary Democracies

Looking at the systems adopted globally to administer democratic governance, there is a variety of models Nations refer to, and it is often the case that mixed systems are adopted to better suit the needs of a given State. Keeping this in mind, there are two main geographical areas where parliamentary republics flourish: Europe and South Asia.⁶ Few States in regions other than the two above mentioned ones present parliamentary forms of democratic governance, however not only they are limited in number, it is also worth mentioning that, excluding the parliamentary democracies that are part of monarchies, they also manifest themselves as isolated cases rather than regional echoes.

To synthesise the essence of such system, “in parliamentary regimes [...] cabinet accountability to parliament produces a fused executive-legislative authority manifested in a cabinet”⁷ in a way that “the cabinet leader, usually known as prime minister, or premier, needs the support of a parliamentary majority to stay in power”⁸. This would be in contrast with the main characteristic of presidentialism, where monarchs are replaced with presidents elected for a fixed term⁹.

While in presidentialism the two functions of Head of Government and Head of State are covered by one elected individual, parliamentarism is centred around the division of the two in separate roles, covered by individuals elected directly and/or indirectly. In a powerful description of the two roles, the Head of State has been defined as “above politics. He or she stands for the things that the members of society have in common, and does not deign to participate in the vulgar squabbles that divide them. The individual who fills this role must therefore be dignified, conventional, and benign to all citizens. Head of State, in other words, personifies the idea of the polity”¹⁰.

On the contrary, “it is the function of the Head of Government [...] to be the chief maneuverer in the vulgar squabbles of politics”¹¹.

It is apparent then, that the role of the President in parliamentary republics is ultimately super partes and aimed at preserving the unity of the Nation. Equally, the presidential office in parliamentary systems is linked to the core values of a Nation and it is aimed at preserving them beyond the mutability of political objectives and agenda.

This interpretation of the fundamental role of the President is reinforced by the specific characteristics of the role of the Head of Government within parliamentary systems. Indeed, it has been powerfully highlighted that “the aspirations, behavior, and achievements of political actors are crucially conditioned by the opportunities and limits set by the institutional framework in which they interact”¹². In line with this consideration, one of the main operational elements of parliamentary systems - that can be looked at as an opportunity for the constituents and the democracy overall, but that can count, at the same time, as limit for the Prime Minister office - is that premature elections can be called, in order to make people decide whenever fundamental “competing claims”¹³ arise between the executive and legislative powers. Looking at this characteristic from the perspective of the protection of democracy, the possibility of premature elections functions as a prevention mechanism to guarantee the good health of the democratic system and get the opportunity to align the political agenda to the core values of a Nation, when the disagreement around such a requirement becomes irresolvable. Indeed, it has been argued that “one of the most powerful arguments for parliamentary systems is their seemingly greater flexibility, which is attributed to the fact that a nonperforming prime minister can easily be dislodged by a no-confidence vote”¹⁴. This is, ultimately, a crucial guarantee of parliamentary systems.

When specifically looking at parliamentary republics in Europe and Asia from a regional lense, it seems relevant to list the countries presenting such similarity in governance, as their individual circumstances and histories - how parliamentary republics came about in such countries - can tell a lot about the nature of the governance of choice and its impact within a State.

In Europe, the countries adopting a parliamentary democratic system in the form of a Republic are:

In South Asia, the countries adopting a parliamentary democratic system in the form of a republic are clearly identifiable as:

Trying to link these very diverse countries from two regions at the opposite sides of the globe with the need for a more flexible system of democratic governance, where the activity of non performing Prime Ministers can be argined through premature elections and giving the power back to the constituents, there are two circumstances that possibly shaped such a structural choice in the countries characterised by parliamentary systems: dictatorship and occupation in Europe, and colonialism in South Asia.

Going back to the role of the President, then, the super partes nature of the office can be possibly connected to the establishment of a mechanism able to bring back the democratic system to the core values of the Nation, whenever these are breached beyond the willingness and power of the constituents.

National Case Studies - A Comparative Approach

There seems to be a fil rouge connecting the countries that organised themselves in parliamentary republics. Looking at this fact as a casualty would be too simplistic. While this is quite evident in the case of South Asia, where the countries adopting parliamentary democracies are united by the history of the Company Rule followed by the British Crown Rule of India, this may be less apparent in the case of Europe, as the republics adopting parliamentary systems present a diverse history that is not unified by a shared experience of oppression, but can still be analysed closely looking at the list of countries, dividing them in groups.

Starting with the more clear examples, Albania, Finland, Germany, Greece and Italy experienced dictatorship in their modern history. So did Austria, as it was part of Germany during Hitler regime. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia also have experience of dictatorship and their history is intertwined by their membership to the federated country of Yugoslavia and its following violent dissolution, with strong elements of religious and ethnic syncretism. The countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia present a mixed history but share the link as Soviet Satellite States, with different levels of agreement towards such political choice within the general public. Both Estonia and Latvia have a tumultuous history of independence and obtained definitive undisputed independence only in the 1990s. Lastly Ireland and Iceland, which differ from this pattern, with Ireland getting independence from the British monarchy through a long multi-staged process that started in 1920 and was only completed in 1948 with the Republic of ireland Act, and Iceland being the only exception to this analysis, with its parliament often being considered one of the oldest surviving parliaments worldwide.¹⁵

Briefly starting with India, it is argued the the choice for a parliamentary system would derive by the equivalent adopted system of democratic governance in Britain¹⁶, with the Queen being replaced by the President as Head of State in the case of India and the major difference being the monarchical versus the republican nature of the two parliamentary democracies. This circumstance has to be taken into account, as there are implications of colonialism that survive independence and the restoration of justice over a territory, but the wording of the Preamble of the Constitution of India may imply more than just a mere adaptation of the British parliamentary system. By stating “We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic¹⁷ and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation¹⁸; in our constituent assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution”, the wording of the Constitution of India - particularly in the parts phrasing as “resolved to constitute India” and “give to ourselves this constitution” - seems to refer to the independence movement and presents a focus on the people - that have always been the holder of the Indian territory, despite being deprived of it - that we do not often find in the Constitutions of States that have not been through the experience of colonialism.

Echoes of such considerations can be found in the Preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, where the post-colonial response and, possibly, the post-partition self determination acquiring independence from Pakistan, is explicitly recalled, stating: “We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our independence on the 26th day of March, 1971 and through a historic struggle for national liberation, established the independent, sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh”. The wording “historic struggle for national liberation” has been amended into “historic war for national independence” in 2011, strengthening the message and rooting the national identity into the history of denied self determination. Indeed, it has been highlighted that such sentiment pre-existed the formal attainment of independence as “this constitutional vision of independence emerged in the halls of electoral politics and prescribed East Pakistan’s autonomy within a federal Pakistan constitution, which proponents of this vision sought to create to free East Pakistan from domination by West Pakistan”¹⁹.

Interestingly, normative language that can be compared to the one adopted in the Bangladeshi Constitution is used in the Preamble of Slovakia’s Constitution. The reasons for this can be possibly linked to the specificities of the history of Slovakia, reclaiming self determination from its soviet satellite nature when still part of Czechoslovakia first, and ultimately with the dissolution of the former State and the establishment of the two successor States of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.²⁰ Indeed, the Preamble explicitly mentions “the struggles for national existence and our own statehood”.

Peculiar is the example of Finland. It can be preliminary noticed that the choice towards a parliamentary system for democratic governance originally made in the 1919 Constitution may have been influenced by the impact of Swedish culture within the country, as a result of the Swedish rule²¹. Indeed, Sweden adopts a parliamentary monarchy system, as well as its neighbouring country Norway, in a way that the democratic choice adopted by Finland may have been partially determined by the link to Sweden, similarly to what has been said about the governance choice adopted in India and how British democracy has possibly affected that. What is truly fascinating in the case of Finland is that the choice of a parliamentary democracy was reiterated in both constitutions of 1919 and 1999, which possibly makes it infer that the choice towards such democratic governance system is not casual, but grounded in fundamental ideas and needs of the Finnish Nation. This can be confirmed by the commentary to the 1919 Constitution, as it has been noticed how “a number of other checks to insure a truly democratic government are embodied in the Organic law, affecting also the Council of State. In all matters vital to the nation, including charges of treason against the President, Parliament has the final voice”²². The rooting of the Finnish national identity in parliamentarism is confirmed in Section 2 of the 1999 Constitution, stating: “The powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by the Parliament. Democracy entails the right of the individual to participate in and influence the development of society and his or her living conditions. The exercise of public powers shall be based on an Act. In all public activity, the law shall be strictly observed”. The strong role attributed to the rule of law in addition to the supremacy of the Parliament within the democratic governance, could possibly be linked to the events which signed the history of the country in between the World Wars, and particularly the role of Mannerheim in ruling the country, which should be addressed as matter of totalitarianism, despite such period being overlooked and regarded as a purely economic crisis²³.

The last case in consideration is the one of Italy, which Constitution is possibly the response to twenty-six years of totalitarianism and fascism. Although not explicitly mentioned in the wording of the Constitution of 1948, it is arguable that the constitutional guarantees included are a reactive mechanism to a set of oppressive legislation, and especially the racial laws signed by Victor Emmanuel III, “in direct violation of every moral principle and of the Constitution then in effect”²⁴. Indeed, it has been argued that “the Constitution of 1948 was to be a powerful refutation of the fascist period”²⁵. Expanding on that and linking it to the practical implications of such ideal objective, “the memory of Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship resulted in the weakening of executive powers and the strengthening of the legislative. [...] One consequence of this was the weakness of Italian government. No control could be exerted by the president, and his prerogatives were mainly restricted to purely representative functions”²⁶. Commenting on these observations, while what said about the governmental function is definitely true, and proven in history, it is arguable that, on the contrary, those prerogatives of the President are strongly directed at putting an additional barrier in the operations of the Government, making them something more than a purely representative function. The President has assumed the role of ultimate defender of the Constitution also, and especially, against the Government. This has been shown in the latest history of Italy, where actually the President has assumed wide powers in determining the formation of new Governments and even nominating Prime Ministers in the so called technical governments, with the current Prime Minister Mario Draghi being the last example of such practice, having been nominated by President Mattarella in February 2021 in response to the governmental crisis, with no election occurred.

Overall, these diverse examples make it possible to argue that the guarantees of parliamentary republics can be seen as a safety net against any breach of citizens’ will within the democratic governance. In line with this, the role of the President is possibly the one of holding that safety net and activating it if it becomes required by the circumstances. For democracies organised into Republics, parliamentarism seems to be the response of peoples with experience of oppression, virtually screaming “never again”. And the President is the impersonation of the office which has an obligation to listen to that demand.

The President of India

As previously recalled, it has been argued that the Constitutional choice leading to the adoption of a parliamentary democratic system in India could be connected to the years of colonial rule and the idea to “replace” the Queen with a President, and attributing legislative power to the Parliament, similarly to what happens in the British system.

It is my personal impression that there is much more to justify and understand this Constitutional choice, and that the experience of colonialism may have impressed an important footprint, such as to make the people of India decide that occupation should never be part of Indian history ever again, and any choice towards a democratic governance system should pursue that unifying objective. This rationale has been explored in the previous paragraphs of this article.

But what is exactly the role of the President of India?

Anecdotally, there may be a speculation that the President of India has a purely representative and celebratory role. Such an impression is usually shared in parliamentary republics towards the respective President. Such an impression is possibly confirmed by the idea that “in a vast country as diverse as India - comprising of so many faiths, languages, political and geographical spread - the office of the President acts as a big unifying force”²⁷. This could also be reiterated by some considerations, made by Prime Minister Nehru within the Draft Committee of the Constitution of India, that, referring to the President, “He is only a figure-head. He is not in the same position of the President of the United States. [...] Now having regard to the fact [...] that the president has really no powers to execute, the last argument [...] that the President should be elected by adult suffrage seems to me to fall to the ground”²⁸. It is incredibly difficult to politely disagree with one of the founding fathers of a country like India. It is, however, widely recognised how “the President of India has been granted the responsibility and authority to protect the Constitution”²⁹. This is further confirmed by the list of powers granted to the President by the Constitution³⁰.

Despite the specificities of the legislative and executive powers granted to the President of India, which can be analysed in depth starting from the Articles of the Constitution itself, it may be relevant to reflect on how “the head of the state is the modern descendant of the ancient Kings and Queens and he is supposed to have the general interests of the nation in his charge as against the party-dominated cabinet and the legislative assembly which are at best instruments for the implementation of party programmes. If the legislatures subserve party ends, the chief executive as the embodiment of the unity of the nation can superimpose the nation over the factional activities of politically organised governmental organs”³¹. Zooming in on the practical implications of such theoretical principles, it is possible to recall the observation made in an editorial of The Indian Express in 1960: “the true scope of the President’s power is to be found in Article 78 by which he has the right to be informed and to call for information about ministerial decisions. In addition he has also the right to demand that any decision by an individual Minister should be submitted to the Council. The general effect of these provisions seems to be to vest in him a residual authority to advise, warn and enforce more mature deliberation of important questions of policy”³².

Additionally, Article 356 of the Constitution, provides wide powers to the President in defying the extent and limits of the presidential rule. The debate around the Article providing for the presidential rule originally clarified that “this Article < < will never be brought into operation > > and < < will remain as a dead letter > > except in grave emergency situations”.³³ However, the “dead letter” of Article 356 has proven to be widely used, having been proclaimed 56 times only between 1950 and 1977.³⁴

Indeed the wording of Article 356, titled “provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States”, allows for a broad interpretation, and it is arguable that such failure may happen, in relation to the principles provided in the Preamble of the Constitution and in relation to the role of the President as ultimate defender of constitutional values, whenever the justice, liberty, and equality granted to all Indian citizens is undermined. In any such cases, the President has, among other powers, competence on either making laws, or conferring legislative power to any authority on his/her behalf, on the basis of Article 357.1(a) of the Constitution.³⁵

While it can be rightly observed that such rule only applies to States’ crisis, this still appears to be a very extended power in the hands of the President, and one susceptible to broad interpretation.

Extraordinary provisions must be read having extraordinary events in mind. In a time of global crises, and with India facing several challenges internally, it does not seem unrealistic that circumstances may require the use of the powers provided by Article 356. Additionally, if we analyse how presidential rule in some or even only one State may impact nationwide dynamics, it must be considered that, on the basis of the 2011 census, Goa, being the smallest State in India, recorded a population of almost 1.5 millions,³⁶ with current figures possibly being higher. In this sense, even a single presidential rule in the smallest State of the Country, would have an impact on Indian constituents that is not inconsistent. This is just one of the reasons why the Presidential Election should receive appropriate attention, not only by politicians and scholars, but especially by the Indian population

Conclusions

In 1947, Sir Winston Churchill made a statement which probably became over popular, beyond the intent of its author, while addressing the House of Commons: “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. The statement, which has been quoted by several scholars including myself, provides an instrumental perspective to the debate over democracy and political systems, which, keeping any substantial judgement aside, is worth acknowledging and keeping in mind. What is probably less known is that Jawaharlal Nehru ji provided a very similar opinion way before that: “Democracy is good. I say this because other systems are worse”. Ultimately, what these statements show us is that, in the balance of interests and powers that play a role in the establishment and management of a State, a privileged position is reserved to the protection of democracy. Not differently, presidential roles within parliamentary systems are key to guarantee that type of protection, which constitutes a priority for any democratic system.

The next President of India, as well as all their predecessors, will play a key and primary role in protecting fundamental values in the most populated democracy of the world, in a way that cannot be ignored nor simplified, and has to be addressed with all the weight it has in itself.