Interview with Sylvia Mishra on India's Defense Relations with Major Powers in the Post- COVID-19 World

Published 13th July 2020 as an Interview by Sylvia Mishra under International Strategic Studies

Interview with Sylvia Mishra on India's Defense Relations with Major Powers in the Post- COVID-19 World

1) What will be the impact of the pandemic on the India-US strategic and defense cooperation?

The India-US relations is a strategic, multi-faceted and multi-sectoral one. It is based on increasing convergence of security goals, a vibrant and growing defense and trade ties, accountability and rule of law, a shared sense of security goals and burden sharing, and a scientific temper focused on innovation. The bedrock of India-US defense and security cooperation is an alignment of strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific. The COVID-19 pandemic has put downward pressures (loss of lives and livelihood, massive destruction of wealth and unprecedented economic losses) on countries globally, and both India and the United States have been severely impacted. Between April and July 2020, it is estimated that India's quarterly GDP declined to over 9% from a 5% growth in the beginning of 2020. Additionally, the estimated cost of a full lockdown in India was $26 billion.1 On the one hand, expectedly the economic pressures will pose budgetary strains on India’s ability to procure cutting edge American technologies and defense equipment. However, on the other, the pandemic has only crystalized India-US strategic cooperation.

Amid the present backdrop of an India-China stand-off in the Himalayas, Chinese assertive behavior, revisionist tendencies and ‘a medieval land-grab mindset’ has precipitated a momentum in Indo-US strategic cooperation which has consolidated developments which were already afoot.2 For instance, during President Trump’s visit to India in February, both countries announced in a joint statement, India’s decision to procure MH-60R Seahawk maritime helicopters and AH-64E Apache helicopters.3 Subsequent defense announcements of the sale of Harpoon air launched missiles and lightweight torpedoes in April showcase that India will continue to depend on American defense sales to bolster its defense preparedness.4 Renowned strategist, C. Raja Mohan has pointed out that the US aircraft flying on the Ladakh frontier include the C-130 transport aircraft and the Chinook and Apache helicopters.5 As the India-China border stand-off ensues, the logic, rationale and embrace of India’s strategic and defense cooperation with the United States will only grow stronger.

2) India has been diversifying its sources of defense supplies, however that means reduced dependence on Russia. How has this changed India’s relations with Russia and will this impact India’s strategic position in the post COVID world?

One of the core tenets of India’s defense policy has been to achieve self-reliance on defense manufacturing. However, there have been several challenges in indigenous defense manufacturing which has led India to invest heavily in imports - procuring military hardware and weapons platforms from a variety of countries, mainly Russia, the United States, Israel, Japan and France. Despite India’s diversification of its defense needs, New Delhi’s decades old defense cooperation with Moscow and its dependence is strong and is likely to remain so in the near future. Even though the United States in the last decade has emerged as one of India’s top defense suppliers, Russia continues to be the largest arms supplier accounting for 58% of its arms imports in 2014-18.6 In the backdrop of India’s border stand-off with China and the COVID-19 world, a few developments indicate the importance India attaches to its strategic partnership with Russia. India’s defense minister, Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow (the first trip abroad since restrictions on foreign travel due to the pandemic) to participate in Russia’s 75th anniversary of the Victory Day parade and expedite the delivery of the S-400 missile defense systems and spares for key Russian-origin platforms demonstrate India’s substantive dependence on Russian imports.7 Undoubtedly, continued India-Russia defense cooperation will act as an irritant in the burgeoning India-US strategic and defense relations. Although it is expected that New Delhi will continue its balancing act as it is in the process of developing a framework of Russian-Indian military technical cooperation until 2030.8

3) China has been able to keep its supply chains more or less intact in the face of the pandemic. Would you see a world even more dependent on China given the strategic spot it has acquired in the global supply chain as the manufacturing hub of the world?

China’s mishandling and covering up of the virus and its spread in the initial days, misleading the World Health Organization, silencing whistle-blowers and obfuscating facts and information has greatly damaged its reputation as a responsible actor and earned Beijing a global backlash. The massive destruction of lives and livelihood and damage to wealth and disruption of supply lines have underscored the need to dilute an over-reliance on China. For the last 3-4 decades China has enjoyed its increasingly dominant role and position in an international manufacturing network. Clearly this has and is posited to come under strain as countries are already shifting and re-mapping supply chains. Historically, China has been integrated into the global supply chains in low value-add industries. However, over time, the Chinese manufacturing industry has been making efforts to move up the supply chain ladder into higher value-add industries. This is evident from the ratio of domestic value added in exports which are steadily increasing.9 Additionally, the Trump administration policies of ‘America First’, trade wars with China and attempts to bring back manufacturing jobs to the US already set developments afoot which were aimed at diversification of supply chains away from China. Amid the pandemic, the expectation is that this diversification will be accelerated. However, given China’s size, economy and voluminous domestic consumption, it will continue to remain an attractive market option for manufacturing conglomerates to gain market access in China and set up shop there. A case in point is Tesla, Inc. which has started the automotive production line in Shanghai.10

4) Do you think it is possible that a nation like China could gain legitimacy and thereby soft power once it establishes itself as a force with dominant capabilities? In other words, which comes first according to you- hard power or soft power? Is it possible that a nation establishes itself as a hard power and then the world has no other option than to accept it as a leader of world values and culture? Or is it the other way around?

The overall shifts in the global balance of economic power from the West to the East and specifically the 2008 international financial crisis accelerated China’s strategic transition. The financial meltdown pushed a weary America into an economic downturn combined with the debilitating consequences of two costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the crisis brought into sharper focus China’s economic might and its ability to weather the financial crisis. China took advantage of America’s weakened strategic position and emphasized on “Asian values”, “win-win cooperation”, and it’s “peaceful rise”. During this time, several countries enlarged their economic ties with China, establishing China as a dominant economic player. China’s economic rise enabled its ability to aggrandize its military and hard power. A decade and half later, the world has been witnessing China shed its “hide and bide” strategy and follow a path of ostentatious display of an assertive foreign policy. A revisionist foreign policy pervades Chinese actions and presently Beijing has territorial and maritime disputeswith a dozen countries.11 Despite Chinese attempts to advance its goals to become a global power through a combination of both hard and soft power, Beijing’s ‘smart power’ (originally defined by American political scientist Joseph Nye as the skillful combination of both hard and soft power) strategy is not working and has some serious flaws. Beijing’s ultra-nationalistic domestic policy, consolidation of power through a surveillance state, repression and persecution of minorities (Uighurs in Xinjiang province), land-grab mindset, predatory loan and economic assistance policies, cyberattacks, intellectual property theft, reverse engineering of defense hardwares - all have contributed to a sense of mistrust among its neighbors and Western powers. In the 21st century, a country leads through smart power strategies. Beijing’s toolkit of implementation of smart power is mostly coercive in nature. This will not garner China influence in the world stage nor earn Beijing any friends. If China desires to be a world leader, Beijing first needs to tame its tendency to dominate and learn to accommodate.

5) There is a growing list of countries unwilling to continue their over-dependence on China in the post-COVID world. What are the major areas of opportunities which we can see opening for countries like India, Philippines and other developing nations in South and South-east Asia?

The COVID-19 pandemic era has offered an opportunity to those businesses looking to both diversify supply chains and reduce manufacturing costs. As multinationals now seek to reduce its dependence on China, countries with adequate supplies of available labor, logistical capabilities will prove attractive for new production sites. While implementing changes to sophisticated global supply routes will not be easy, it is essential to do so. Several countries in South and South-east Asia (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam),present good alternative options. Specific sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture and poultry, energy deserve special attention in supply chain restructuring strategies. South and South-east Asian countries need to provide easier access to markets, lower regulatory and economic costs to doing business, and advance supply of skilled labor trained in specific targeted industries.

References

Sylvia Mishra

Sylvia Mishra is a Washington D.C. based researcher working on Asian security issues, nuclear policy and disruptive technologies. She is the Co-Chair of the WCAPS CBRN Working Group and CSIS PONI mid-cadre fellow. She holds a MSc degree in International Relations from London School of Economics and Political Science and M.A. in Non- proliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. She has been invited to present papers, deliver talks and participate in crisis simulation and Track II dialogues at various national and international forums like the Ford Foundation, Columbia University, Stanford University, Council on Foreign Relations. Her publications include chapters in books, articles in journals, and commentaries/opinion pieces and was featured in Women in Foreign Policy. Currently, she is pursuing doctoral studies and her research focuses on nuclear strategy and non-proliferation, Southern Asian security and emerging and disruptive technologies.

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